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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT B. KLINGER and KAROL
J. KLINGER,

*

Plaintiffs,

*

Case No.

930525 CA

Priority No.
EUGENE E. KIGHTLY, HELEN L.
RIGHTLY, HARRY D. KREIS,
PEGGY R. KREIS BARNETT,

15

*
*

Defendants/Third-Party
*
Plaintiffs and Appellees
vs.
*

GLEN H. CALDER, and JOHN
DOE WILSON, individually and
d/b/a WILSON CALDER,

*

Third-Party Defendants
and Appellants.

*

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended, 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial Court err in not holding that the statute of

limitations had run?
should

have

In not holding that Appellees discovered, or

discovered,

the

1

surveyors1

error,

and

Calder's

negligence?
2.

Did the trial Court err in its assessment of damages?

3.

Did the trial Court err in excluding from evidence the

journal of John Stafford?
4.

Did the trial Court err in denying Defendant's objections

and in not holding a hearing?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an Appeal by Third Party Defendant, Glen H. Calder, a
licensed professional land surveyor, from a judgment of the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
James

Sawaya, based

upon

the

Court's

finding

of

professional

negligence and award of damages to the Third Party Plaintiffs,
referred to herein as the Appellees.
Appellees were the purchasers of property in an area called
Strawberry River Estates located in Duchesne County, Utah.

Being

concerned about the exact location of the boundaries they contacted
and hired a surveyor whom they believed to be the engineering firm
of Wilson & Calder, to locate the boundaries of the 40 acre parcel
they purchased.

The property was purportedly surveyed and the

boundaries located by placing corner markers.

Appellees later

received a Certificate of Survey dated May 15, 1972 representing
the 4 0 acre parcel of property was surveyed by Appellant, Wilson &
Calder, under signature of Glen H. Calder.

Appellees sold the

subject property to a Mr. and Mrs. Klinger.

In the early part of

2

1985,

the

Klingerfs

discovered

there

boundaries of the subject property.
that

there

was

a

discrepancy

was

a problem

with

the

At this time it was discovered

between

the

metes

and

bounds

description of the subject property and the placing of the boundary
markers pursuant to the survey by Appellant, resulting in damages
to Appellees.

Appellees sued Appellant for negligence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellees are related to one another.
Uniform

Real

Estate

Contract

containing

In June, 1971, by
a

metes

and

bounds

description, they purchased a parcel of real property comprising
thirty (30) acres from Strawberry River Estates located in Duchesne
County, Utah.

The 3 0 acre parcel had a "large T11 configuration,

with 2 0 acres being situated West of Red Creek and 10 acres East of
Red Creek.

(R. 29-32; Ex P-3; Ex P-12,13)

Appellees were contacted in October, 1971 by representatives
of

Strawberry

River

Estates, because

the

3 0 acre

"T" shaped

property sold them had left two 5 acre plots on each side of the 10
acre portion East of Red Creek which could not be sold.

Strawberry

River Estates gave Appellees an option to even up the 10 acres East
of Red Creek to a 20 acre parcel, or trade the 3 0 acre parcel they
had purchased for other acreage in a different location. (R. 33-34)
Appellees declined to trade the 3 0 acre parcel and were given the
two 5 acre parcels East of Red Creek, to increase the total acreage
3

to 4 0 acres, the original 20 acres West of Red Creek and now 2 0
acres East of Red Creek,

Appellees received a new Uniform Real

Estate Contract from Strawberry River Estates, which was back dated
to June, 1971, with a new metes and bounds description represented
to include the additional 10 acres East of Red Creek.

(R. 34-39;

Ex. P-6; Ex. P-12,13)
Having reservations and concerns regarding the exact location
of the boundaries of the 4 0 acre parcel, Appellees decided to have
the property surveyed.

(R.39; 119-120)

The Kightlys contacted

and hired a surveyor whom they believed to be the engineering firm
of Wilson & Calder, to survey the 4 0 acre parcel of property and
left a copy of the Uniform Real Estate Contract containing the new
metes and bounds description with the representative.
(R. 40-41; Ex. P-6)
Appellees, at the time they made the initial purchase of the
3 0 acre parcel, requested and received access to the 2 0 acres West
of Red Creek through adjoining property to the South.
(R. 47-48)

Appellees subsequently paid Strawberry River Estates

or their assignees in full and received a Warranty Deed through
Security Title Company dated October 24, 1980, for the 40 acre
parcel by metes and bounds description, together with the access
road to the 20 acres situate West of Red Creek.

(R. 49; Ex. P-8)

From the time they acquired the subject property to 1983 when
they decided to sell it, Appellees used it for recreation and
camping, repaired the fence along the County road and put in fence
4

posts East of Red Creek along the North and South boundaries
established by the Calder survey to the County road.

(R. 4, 50)

Appellees received a Certificate of Survey dated May 15, 1972
representing

the

40

acre

parcel

of property

was

surveyed

by

Appellant, Wilson & Calder, under signature of Glen H. Calder.
(Ex.

P-l)

This

Certificate

certified

the

location

of

the

property, the dimensions of the property and that there were no
encroachments.

Appellant, Calder, acknowledged, after the fact,

that the placing of the corner markers by representatives of Wilson
& Calder was done with the aid of a plat map, not the metes and
bounds

description

received

of

the

from Mr. Kightly.

Certificate of Survey

Uniform

Real

Estate

(R. 40; Ex.

P-6)

Contract
However,

they
the

(Ex. P-l) contains the metes and bounds

description of the Uniform Real Estate Contract (Ex. P-6) without
any reference to a plat or Lot numbers.

Appellant, Glen H.

Calder, having signed the Certificate of Survey, contrary to the
representations therein:
(a)

Did not prepare the Certificate of Survey (Ex. P-l)

and does not know who did; (R. 146)
(b)

He did not perform the survey.

Wilson Calder did the survey.
(c)

No one from

(R. 146-149);

The survey was not made under his direction.

He did not direct anyone to perform the survey; (R. 149-150)
(d)

Did not see the Uniform Real Estate Contract

(Ex. P-6) before the survey.
5

He never checked the Survey

Certificate

against the plat maps at the Duchesne

Recorder's Office;
(e)

County

(R. 151-152)

Did not check if the corner markers were properly

placed according to the metes and bounds description.
He never went on the property.
(f)

(R. 153)

Admitted that the persons who performed the survey

and placed the corner markers were his former students,
were not licensed or registered with the State of Utah as
surveyors and he agreed to sign the Certificate for a 10% fee;
(R. 153-155)
(g)

He did not have or maintain an office under the

name Wilson & Calder in Duchesne in 1972.

He knew from

his professional experience that Appellees would rely
upon the Certificate of Survey; (R. 156)
(h)

He did not prepare the key map.

(Ex. P-l), He

made a judgment call on the key map and never communicated
information on the key map to anyone. (R. 157-159)
(i)

The persons who requested Mr. Calder to sign the

Certificate of Survey were not his employees.

He did not

review their field notes or the plat they claimed they worked
from.

(R. 160-163)

The subject property was listed for sale by the Appellees with
a realtor, Gerald Wilkerson.

Klingers purchased the property

after they had made a physical inspection of the property, were
6

shown the corner markers placed by the surveyors on the West side
of Red Creek with the aid of the Calder Certificate of Survey.
(R. 97-102)

Appellees conveyed the property

to Klingers by

Warranty Deed and received in return a Trust Deed and Trust Deed
Note for the purchase price of $32,000.00.

(R. 51-52; 98; 102)

In the early part of 1985, some time in the month of February,
the Klingers discovered there was a problem with the boundaries of
the subject property.

They contacted Mr. Kightly, one of the

Appellees, at his home and informed him that there apparently was
a mistake with the survey.
for rescission.

(R. 55, 102)

Klingers brought suit

The Court awarded Klingers judgment and ordered

the Appellees to repay

to the Klingers

some

$13,800.00 which

constituted payments made for the property, taxes and interest.
(R. 56-58)

The portion of the property in dispute caused by the

defective survey comprised the 2 0 acre parcel West of Red Creek
only.

There was no dispute as to the 2 0 acre parcel East of Red

Creek.

(R. 62)

Appellees presented testimony and evidence of their damages
which they claimed exceeded $41,000.00.
Ex. P-9)

(R. 57-59; 63-64;

Appellees damages were supported by the testimony of the

realtor, Gerald Wilkerson.

(R. 107-112)

The Third Party Complaint of Appellees was filed May 16, 1986,
well within the 4 year period of limitations after they learned of
the negligent survey performed by Appellant. ( R. 16)

7

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD NOT RUN, THE DISCOVERY RULE
BEING APPLICABLE TO THE TOLLING OF THE STATUTORY PERIOD AND
THE ACT OF DISCOVERY BEING A FACTUAL ISSUE. SINCE REVIEW OF
FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS IS BASED ON A RATIONAL-BASIS STANDARD,
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO INVALIDATE THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION.
Appellant presents this Appeal as focusing on issues of law.
A closer look however, reveals that many of these issues are
factual, and that what Appellant really desires is appellate review
of an adverse trial Court decision.

This is especially the case

with Appellantfs first issue, that of whether the trial Court erred
in holding that Appellees claim was not barred by the statute of
limitations.
Whether the trial Court should have held that the statute of
limitations had run did not turn on issues of law.
Supreme

Court

had

already

made

clear

that,

in

The Utah

professional

liability cases, including services provided by licensed surveyors,
the discovery rule applies, delaying the tolling of the statute of
limitations

until

the

discovered, the injury.
1990).

Plaintiff

discovers,

or

should

have

Klinger v. Kightlv, 791 P. 2d 868 (Utah

Therefore, the issue in the present case was factual,

focusing not on whether such a rule should exist, but on when,
8

given the facts and circumstances of the present case, Appellees
knew, or should have known, of the injury complained of.
Id. at 869 ("cause of action does not accrue and the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the Plaintiff learns of, or
in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of, the
facts which give rise to the cause of action").
Appellant quotes Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981),
which was recently quoted in Sevy v. Security Title Co., 857 P.2d
958

(Ut. App. 1993) , for its articulation of the traditional

doctrine of limitations, especially Myers' statement that:
The general rule is that a cause of action accrues
upon the happening of the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action. Under that rule, mere
ignorance of the existence of a cause of action does
not prevent the running of the statute of limitations.
Myers, at 86.
This Appeal to Myers is, however, misplaced.

In Myers, the issue

was not how the discovery rule should apply, but whether it should
be extended to a hit-and-run negligence case.

At the time, the

discovery rule had not been extended far beyond its original
context of medical malpractice, and therefore, the Court was
understandably cautious in considering new applications. The Court
balanced the burden to Defendant of allowing an old claim against
the uniqueness of Plaintiff's circumstances (in this case, the fact
that Plaintiffs were unable to bring their claim during the
statutory period because they were unaware that their family member
had been killed).
9

Thus, the issue in Myers was not how to determine whether
Plaintiff had sufficient knowledge to have discovered the injury,
but whether, and on what basis, the discovery
applied

to a new set of circumstances.

rule should

be

Likewise, Klinaer v.

Kiahtlv brought the discovery rule to a new setting: professional
liability among surveyors.

In fact, the Court in Klinaer stated:

Applying the balancing test to the present case, we
find the obvious prejudice to Defendants (Appellees here)
is that without application of the discovery rule, their
cause of action is completely barred regardless of whether
their complaint is in contract or in tort . . . .
They had
no reason to suspect that the survey was inaccurate, nor
did they refrain from doing anything that might reasonably
have been expected of them that could have disclosed the
error . . . Utilizing the balancing test and being
conscious of the purposes of the statutes of limitation,
we hold that under the facts of this case the evidence is
not so stale or remote as to outweigh the prejudice to
Defendants to having their claim barred by the statute of
limitation. The discovery rule should be applied to the
statute of limitation for surveyor negligence under Utah
Code Annotated 78-12-25(2). Id. at 872.
Nor was the Court acting capriciously when it held, in Klinger,
that

surveyor

discovery rule.

negligence

cases

ought

to

be

governed

by

Rather, it was following a national trend.

the
See

Downing v. Vaine, 228 So.2d 622 (Fla.App. 1969), Appeal dismissed,
237 So.2nd 767 (Fla. 1970); Mattinalv v. Hopkins, 253 A.2d 904 (Md.
1969); Feldman v. Granger, 257 A.2d 421 (Md. 1969); New Market
Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Fellows, 241 A.2d 633 (N.J. 1967)

(Statute

of limitations would not begin to run against Plaintiff claiming
damage arising from alleged error committed in 1952 by engineers
and land surveyors in connection with calculation of acreage in
10

parcels of realty but would begin to run from 1963 when new survey
was

obtained

and

sustained injury);

Plaintifffs

assignor

learned

that

she

had

E. A. Williams, Inc. v. Russon Development, 411

A. 2d 697 (N.J. 1980) (Claim asserted against surveyor by foundry
owner, who discovered in 1972 a 1954 surveying error . . . was not
barred by statute of limitations); Kundahl v. Barnett, 486 P. 2d
1164 (Wash. App. 1971) (Action against land surveyor for negligence
in making survey did not accrue until injured party discovered or
had reasonable grounds to discover error in survey); Hudesman v.
Meriwether Leachman Associates, 666 P.2d

937

(Wash. App. 1983)

(Cause of action for erroneous survey accrued five years later when
a second survey uncovered the error).
Thus, the importance of Myers is simply to set up a framework
for the new application of the discovery rule, not to carve out an
exception to it.

Appellant is right:

enough to delay the statutory period.
apply to every setting.

Mere ignorance is not

The discovery rule does not

It does, however, apply to surveyor

liability cases, at least in Utah, and a growing number of other
states, and therefore, the invocation of Myers is irrelevant. With
greater industry, Appellant could have cited Whatcott v. Whatcott,
790 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1990), to the effect that "Exceptional
circumstances and resulting delayed discovery, tolling the statute
of limitations, exist only in those circumstances where application
of the general
unjust."

statute

of limitations would

be

irrational

or

Id. To do so, however, would have been just as irrelevant
11

since the foundational question of whether or not to invoke the
discovery rule is already mute.
Appellate review of a trial Court's Findings of Fact proceeds
according to a well-defined standard of review.

The role of the

Appellate Court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
trial Court, but merely to decide whether there was a sufficient
basis for its Finding of Fact.

Therefore, the Court must look to

the evidence, and viewing it most favorably to the Findings of
Fact, determine whether there was any rational basis on which the
Court could have concluded as it did.
Partnership

v.

Finlinson,

782

P.2d

See Grayson Roper Ltd.
467

(Utah

1989)

(To

successfully attack trial Court's Findings of Fact, Appellant must
first marshall all the evidence in support of the Findings and then
demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the Findings against an
attack); College Irr. Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork Irr.
Co. , 780 P.2d

1241

(Utah

1989)

("Finding of trial

Court

is

entitled to presumption of correctness and on Appeal, the evidence
is surveyed

in

light most

favorably

to

finding;

if there

is

reasonable basis in the evidence to support finding, finding will
not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.)

The standard

favors upholding the trial Court's decision. The Appellant has the
burden of proving that there was no substantial basis for the
decision.
Consequently, Appellant must do more than claim that "there
12

was ample evidence" Appellee knew, or should have known, of the
injury (that Appellant was negligent in performing, supervising or
validating the surveying of the property at issue). Appellant must
show that the case is so strong (that Appellee knew or should have
known) that it was clearly unreasonable for the fact finder to hold
otherwise, and that its determination was essentially irrational.
Appellant's

sole

argument

of

knowledge,

actual

or

constructive, is a ten-foot discrepancy between the description of
appellees1 property in the Uniform Real Estate Contract (which
indicated that the property commenced 32 0 feet West of the section
line) and a Warranty Deed they received nine years later (which
placed that number at 330 feet) after completion of the access
road.

In the absence of stronger evidence, Appellant cannot

emphasize enough the importance of those ten feet, and would argue
that their existence is enough to reasonably impute Appellees with
a knowledge of their injury, and to invalidate the trial Court's
decision to the contrary.
Looking, however, at the overall circumstances available to
the

fact

finder, which Appellate

Courts

in this State have

prudently acknowledged as being most available to the Trial Courts,
there is ample evidence to support the fact finder's determination.
Most immediately compelling is the fact that this was a remote, 4 0
acre tract, originally displayed on an unrecorded subdivision plat,
sold by an unrecorded contract with metes and bounds description,
and later conveyed by Deed in terms of metes and bounds.
13

The size

of the tract, by itself, is enough to dwarf the ten feet into
insignificance, but there are other bases on which the trial Court
could

have

minimal.

reasonably

considered

Appellees1

knowledge

to

be

Such factors include the remote location of the property

(a question of ten feet would tend to matter more, and be more
conspicuous, in a residential neighborhood than on undeveloped
wilderness land whose boundaries with other properties are less
intuitive and less defined), the lack of a recorded plat and the
apparent

ad-hoc

parceled

out

manner

(including

in

which

the

property

confusing,

was

subdivided

and ultimately

and

harmful

conversion of the property from its original "T" shape) , with plats
denoting lots changed in description to metes and bounds.

The

trial Court could have considered any and all of these factors in
determining that the

level of knowledge available to the Appellees

as lay persons was insufficient to commence the tolling of the
statute of limitations.
Moreover, the Court apparently took into consideration the
intrinsic difference between a minor discrepancy (whether the lot
extends 32 0 or 3 30 feet from the section line) governing the edge
of the property and the negligent failure of the surveying party to
discover

a

loss,

not

of

10

feet,

but

of

1000

feet,

which

effectively stripped Appellees of virtually all of the property
West of Red Creek.

(R. 182-184)

In fact, the Court had

the

testimony of Mr. Kightly who admitted knowing of the discrepancy
but who had "thought it might be just a typographical error.11
14

(R.

414) Under such circumstances, it would not have been unreasonable
for the Court to infer that a discrepancy of a few feet, in an area
comprising 40 acres of largely undeveloped wilderness land, would
fail to put a lay person on notice that 20 acres of property had
been incorrectly surveyed. A major factor the Court considered was
that the corner markers were set by use of a plat not metes and
bounds description. The Certificate of Survey contained the metes
and bounds description without any reference to a plat or lot
numbers (R. 470-471, 530-532).
Therefore, since this Court is being asked to review a trial
Court's Finding of Fact (namely, that Appellees should have known
of the injury to their property rights), and Appellant has failed
to show clear error on the part of the fact finder, this most
important of issues should be decided for Appellees.

POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO APPELLEES
In alleging that the trial Court erred in its award of trial
damages, Appellant has formulated the issue to give the appearance
of raising another question of law, rather than fact, so as to give
the Appellate Court the widest latitude in reviewing the Findings
of the trial Court.
that Appellant
Appellant

Upon closer examination, however, it appears

has merged

two

was negligent, and

separate

therefore
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issues:
liable

(a) whether

for Appellees

injuries, which is a question of fact; and (b) what the proper
assessment of damages should be, which is also a question of fact,
reviewable under a rational basis standard.
Negligence is an issue normally relegated to trial Courts
because of its dependence on other factual inquiries. Apache Tank
Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P. 2d 614

(Utah 1985)

(Issues of

negligence ordinarily present questions of fact to be resolved by
the fact finder; it is only when facts are undisputed and but one
reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom that such issues
become questions of law).

As noted previously, the role of the

Appellate Court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
trial Court, but to ensure that the fact finder does not act
without a sufficient basis. Since, under review, Appellant has the
burden of proving that no such basis exists, it is up to the
Appellant to show the trial Court erred, rather than the Appellee
to show that it did not.
Appellant, however has put forth arguments that utterly fail
to do that. First, Appellant argues that he did not participate in
the preparation of the documents used to transfer title to the
Appellees, and therefore, was not involved in the loss of title
that Appellees suffered as a result.

That much is true.

It is,

however, irrelevant since the damage which Appellees were awarded
in this suit were not for the original property loss, a loss
governed by principles of contract and property law, but for the
subsequent

damage

they

suffered
16

because

of

their

reasonable

reliance upon the skills of the surveyors.
In addition, Appellant argues that it is speculative whether
Appellees would have remedied the situation had they known of it.
Certainly, that issue is open to argument, but it would surely not
be unreasonable for the fact finder to infer that but for the
Defendant's negligence

in certifying the surveying done, the

Appellees would have become aware of the defect, and would have
likely cured it (since the difference in value to their property
was great), and at the very least, they would not have been likely
to enter into a sale of land which they did not own.

In fact,

Appellant would have this Court believe that the Appellees "strain
at a gnat and swallow a camel," that they were sophisticated enough
to link a ten foot discrepancy in the description of the western
edge of their property with the loss of 20 acres, but either blind
or calloused to the catastrophic consequences that would come from
selling property they did not own, and at a time when that property
was at its peak in value.
individuals

that

performed

It is apparent from the evidence the
the

survey

did

not

compare

the

description of Exhibit "6" with the Allen plat Exhibit "5".
In fact, the Court heard evidence that the Appellees procured
the survey after the change in property from the original 3 0 acres
to 40 acres to be sure where the boundaries lay.

(R. 39, 119-120)

Appellees relied upon the surveyors to perform this task.

They

paid for the survey and were given a certificate of survey with the
following warranty:
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I, Glen H. Calder, do hereby certify that I am a
Registered Land Surveyor in the State of Utah, and
that the plat described hereon portrays a survey made
by me or under my direction. I further certify that
the above plat correctly shows the true dimensions
of the property surveyed and of the improvements
located thereon; and further that there are no
encroachments on said property. (Ex. P. 1)
This certificate was signed by Glen H. Calder and bore the logo of
"Wilson and Calder: Consulting Engineers and Surveyors, Duchesne,
Utah."

This Certificate

assured Appellees that

they were

protected, that the land they purchased and sold was theirs.
51, 122-123)

(R.

That assurance being false, and their reliance upon

it in the sale of the land, as well as the attendant losses they
suffered as a result, make it more than reasonable for the trial
Court

to

conclude

that

there

did

exist

a

proximate

casual

connection between Appellant's negligence and appellees loss.
Appellant's second argument is that appellees use of the
description contained in the Warranty Deed proves that they did not
rely upon the accuracy of the Certificate in making the sale of
property "that Appellees never owned."
argument

is

that

it

construes

The problem with this

reliance

all

too

narrowly.

Ordinarily, when property is sold, it is the Deed which the parties
look to in making their conveyance. This is not to say that those
who sell property do not also rely upon surveyance of their
property.

In deciding where to put a wall, where to grow flowers,

or where to excavate a pool or a basement, for example, property
owners procure and rely upon surveyors to assure them of where
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their boundaries are.

When property is sold, however, sellers

don't wave certificates of survey and say, "this is my survey.
There is where the boundary is."

The more common practice is to

rely upon the description of the property in the Deed and the
boundary markers that have been placed. Thus, appellant is making
more of this fact than is warranted.
Moreover, though reliance may not always be manifested in an
explicit and immediate way, that is not to say that property owners
do not rely upon past surveys when selling their property.

Though

they may not waive the certificate of survey into the air (they are
more likely to focus on the warranty and title deeds as proof of
their right to convey), there is no question that property owners
rely upon such surveys to make sure where their boundaries are,
sometimes to avoid violating

someone else's property rights,

sometimes to protect their own, and

sometimes to make sure

representations they make in conveying such property are truthful.
(R. 93,99-100, 123-124)

In the end, the trial Court could have

drawn upon such matters to reasonably conclude that Appellees had
relied upon Appellant's assurances that their boundaries were
legitimate.
Appellant's third argument may be his weakest.
argues

that

such

damages

were

not

foreseeable

due

Here, he
to

"an

unforeseeable artificial spike in the real estate market due to the
oil crises."

(Appellant's Brief, at 24).

It would seem that

Appellant believes that the value of land, unlike the value of
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other forms of property, can be divided into artificial prices and
normal prices.

That the value of the land before the oil boom was

significantly less than that which it had during the oil boom is
clear.

That this was somehow "artificial" and places appellant

beyond the reach of the law is not so obvious.

It is common

experience that property values go up and down, and not always
predictable.

People live their lives on the premise that the home

they make payments on will increase in value over time; people
invest in real estate, including recreational property such as
this, on the same basis.
Thus, though one may argue about how foreseeable it was that
this property would rise in value, and perhaps descend in value at
a later date, the idea that this happens all the time, or that it
could happen here, was hardly unforeseeable.
real estate market.

That is a risk of the

It is, in fact, a risk that property owners

deal with, in one way, by having their property surveyed, just as
they buy title insurance.

In fact, Appellant, of all people,

should perhaps be least surprised by the possibility that a bad
surveying of the property could lead to economic catastrophe.

That

is why surveyors are licensed by the state (to protect innocent lay
persons from bad surveyors).

If a restaurant owner is expected to

foresee such problems as food poisoning from his food, injuries
from dangerous conditions on the premises, and vicarious liability
as an employer and property owner, surely a surveyor, licensed by
the state, should hardly be able to cry "unforeseeability" when his
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negligence harms a property owner. Property, especially investment
property, is dynamic in its value.

That's one of the reasons

property owners procure surveys, and why it is not unreasonable for
the fact finder to be less than impressed with foreseeability as a
defense.
Finally, Appellant points to conflicting testimony at trial
regarding the value of the property, before and after, and of the
damages assessed (R. 98,107-113, Ex. P-9)

Even if one were to

concede such to have been the case, the point is irrelevant.

The

trial Court's finding of damages is subject to review only it if is
not supportable by the evidence on a reasonable basis.

The

evidence does not have to be consistent. Chandler v. Matthews, 734
P. 2d 907 (Utah 1987) (Trial court as trier of fact is free to
assess credibility of witnesses, and conflict in evidence alone is
not grounds for reversal).
through

the

evidence

It is the fact finder's job to sift

presented,

to make

judgments

regarding

credibility, and to make a factual determination as to what the
damages were.

For this Court to involve itself in making its own

determination of damages, without the benefits that the trial Court
had, would be imprudent.

Appellant may feel justified in arguing

that his own assessment of damages is a better one, but that is not
the standard of review.

The test is whether the fact finder had

any rational basis for making its determination based on the
evidence.

Since Appellant has failed to prove the contrary, this

argument, like its predecessors, fails to invalidate the trial
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Court's decision.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING FROM EVIDENCE THE
JOURNAL OF JOHN STAFFORD.
The admissibility of evidence is a question of law reviewed
under a correctness standard, Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau,
Inc., 832 P.2d 62 (Utah App.1992)

The question, then, for this

Court is whether it was correct for the trial Court to exclude
evidence of Mr. Stafford's Journal.
Hearsay,

as defined

by Utah

law,

is an

oral

or

written

assertion, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
trial,

offered

asserted.

in evidence

to prove

URE 801(a)(b) & (c)

the truth

of the

matter

Therefore, a written statement by

an out-of-court declarant, offered for its truth, would normally
and properly be excluded as evidence unless it fell under one of
the exceptions established in URE 803.
Appellant

cites URE

803(6),

which

outlines

the

"business

records" exception, a support for the position that the diary of
Mr. Stafford was admissible.

For evidence to be admissible as a

business record, a proper foundation must be laid to establish "the
necessary indicia of reliability," including: (1) that it be made
in the regular course of the business or entity which keeps the
record; (2) that it have been made at or near the time in which the
act occurred; (3) that it has been kept under circumstances that
22

would preserve its integrity; and

(4) that the sources of the

information from which the entry was made and the circumstances of
the preparation

of the document were such as to indicate

its

trustworthiness. State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1993).
Even if Appellant could show compliance with all of the above
requirements, admission of such testimony would not automatically
come in.

The above requirements are a necessary, though not

sufficient condition of admissibility.

They merely establish, if

proven, that the document merits exception to the hearsay evidence
rule.

Such testimony may still be excluded for other reasons, just

as non-hearsay could be excluded for a variety of other reasons.
Perhaps the most basic reason to exclude any evidence is
relevance, the notion that even if competent and reliable, such
evidence does not bear upon a material fact at issue.

URE

4 01

defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make
the

existence

of

any

fact

that

is

of

consequence

to

the

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
could be without the evidence, while evidence which is not relevant
is not admissible."

URE 402.

The real issue then, regardless of whether

Appellant can

establish Mr. Stafford's Journal as a "business record," is whether
anything contained within it is relevant to the issues of this
case.
higher,

The standard of review for relevance, however, is much
given

the dependence

of

relevance

upon

other

factors

bearing upon a case, factors which trial Courts are usually better
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qualified

to

determine.

As

stated

in

Terry

v.

Zions

Coop

Mercantile Inst., 605 P. 2d 314,323 (Utah 1979) (overruled on other
grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Cos.,Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984):
It is generally conceded the trial Court is more
competent, in the exercise of this discretion, to
judge the exigencies of a particular case and,
therefore, when exercised within normal limits, the
discretion should not be disturbed. The general
rule followed by this Court is the judgment of the
trial court will not be reversed unless it is shown
that the discretion exercised therein has been abused.
Later cases by this Court have come to similar conclusions:

Hardy

v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1989) (Court of Appeals will not
reverse trial Court's determination on admissibility of proffered
evidence absent abuse of discretion affecting party's substantial
rights); Fisher by and through Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P. 2d 204 (Utah
App.

1988)

(Trial

Court's

rulings

regarding

admissibility

of

evidence will not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that the
court was in error) ; State by and through Utah State Department of
Social Services v. Woods, 742 P.2d 118 (Utah App. 1987) (Decision
whether to admit expert testimony ordinarily lies within discretion
of trial court, whose ruling should be sustained unless it is
proven that it was clearly erroneous); Whitehead v. American Motors
Sales Corp, 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990) (In reviewing questions of
admissibility of evidence at trial, deference is given to the trial
court's advantageous position and thus, that court's rulings will
not be overturned unless it clearly appears that the lower court
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was in error) ; Erickson v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 P. 2d 1323 (Utah
App.

1990)

(Court

determination

on

of Appeals will
admissibility

of

not

reverse

evidence

trial

absent

court's

abuse

of

discretion affecting party's substantial rights); State of Interest
of LPS v. Stevens, 797 P. 2d 1133

(Utah App. 1990)

(The trial

court's decision to admit or exclude evidence will not be reversed
in the absence of an abuse of discretion).
What Constitutes an Abuse of Discretion
Utah has never defined an abuse of discretion.

Her sister

states, however, have.
In Idaho, the relevant test is whether the trial court (1)
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with legal standards
applicable to specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its
decision by exercise of discretion. O'Dell v. Basabe, 810 P. 2d 1082
(Idaho 1991); Blackadar v. Austin, 826 P.2d 490 (Idaho App. 1992)
In Wyoming, abuse of discretion is "that which shocks the
conscience of the court and appears so unfair and inequitable that
a reasonable person could not abide it. Waldrop v. Weaver, 702 P. 2d
1291 (Wyo. 1985).
In Colorado, abuse of discretion has not been

explicitly

defined but the standard is that of "a clear abuse of discretion."
In re Marriage of Zebedee, 778 P.2d 694 (Colo. App. 1988), cert,
dismissed; Helen G. Bonfils Foundation v. Denver Post Employees
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Stock Trust, 674 P.2d 997 (Colo. App. 1983)
In New Mexico, the test is whether the trial court's ruling is
"clearly against logic and the effect of facts and circumstances.11
Alpers v. Alpers, 806 P.2d 1057 (N.M. App. 1990); Roselli v. Rio
Communities Service Station, Inc., 787 P.2d 428 (N.M. 1990).
In Arizona, abuse of discretion

is discretion

manifestly

unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable
reasons.

Torres for and on behalf of Torres v. North American Van

Lines, Inc., 658 P.2d 835 (Ariz. App. 1982).
In Nevada, abuse of discretion requires "a clear ignoring" of
the "established guides" of legal principles. Franklin v. Bartsas
Realty, Inc., 598 P.2d 1147 (Nev. 1979)
In

Montana,

arbitrarily,

the

without

test

is

whether

employment

of

the

trial

conscientious

exceeded bounds of reason, resulting

court

acted

judgment,

in substantial

or

injustice.

Goodman v. Goodman, 723 P.2d 219 (Mont. 1986)
In Washington, the test is whether the ruling is "manifestly
unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable
reasons.
1109

Birch Bay Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Whatcom County, 829 P. 2d

(Wash. App. 1992) .

person

would

take

the

This is the case "when no reasonable
position

adopted

by

the

trial

court."

Northwest Land and Inv. Inc. v. New West Federal Savings and Loan
Assoc., 827 P.2d 334 (Wash. App. 1992).
In California, the test is whether the trial court exceeded
the bounds of reason; when two or more inferences can be reasonably
26

deduced from the facts the reviewing court has no authority to
substitute its decision for that of the trial court.

Shamblin v.

Brattain, 749 P.2d 339 (Cal. 1988).
It Was Not an Abuse of Discretion to Exclude the Diary
Given any of the standards related above, it is unlikely that
the trial court
irrelevant.

abused

its discretion

in deeming

the diary

Assuming the diary could have been established as a

"business record," what it contained was not relevant to the issue
of the case, namely, whether Mr. Calder had been negligent in
signing off and certifying a survey he had never supervised. It is
the negligence of Calder, not that of the BYU students who
conducted the survey, that is at issue.

What Appellant seems to

want is a review of the negligence of the survey itself, rather
than to argue that Calder was acting as a reasonable person in
certifying that the survey was performed under his direction when
it was clearly not.

Since Stafford's diary concerns only the

original survey, rather than Calder's subsequent action, it has no
bearing on the issue of Calderfs negligence, and the trial court
was

not

abusing

its discretion

in

excluding

such evidence.

Appellant attempted to show the survey was done at the request, and
paid for by Strawberry River Estates, via the diary.

Mr. Ostler

testified that the bill he collected was for work done for Leisure
International, not Strawberry River Estates. (R. 205-207) That at
the time of the survey, they were not in a business arrangement
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with Calder (R. 198).

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT
INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF THE RECONVEYANCE.
Appellant argues that the Court should not have awarded
pre-judgment

interest

because

the

measure

of

damages

was

"inherently uncertain and without mathematical precision."
(Appellant's Brief, at 33) This argument rests upon the rule, used
in determining

liquidated

damages, that

such

damages

must

be

complete, certain and calculable with mathematical precision.
Price-Orem Inv Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, 784 P.2d 475 (Utah
App.

1989)

Appellant's

argument

fails

to

recognize

the

inapplicability of such a doctrine to the present case, which is
not one for breach of contract, but one in tort.

The doctrine of

"liquidated damages" is a contract theory.
This is a tort case, not a contract dispute.

Unlike in

Price-Orem, where liability was sought as a "liquidated damage,"
spelled

out

in

the

contract,

Appellees

case

professional malpractice and detrimental reliance.

is

based

upon

It is governed

by tort law, which deems the loss to have occurred at the time the
tort was committed, and which allows for pre-judgment
dating from the time of that tort.
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interest

See generally 22 Am.Jur 2d,

Section 194.

In fact, in awarding such damages, the trial court

only dated the interest back to 1986, when the Appellees brought
suit, rather than to 1972, the date of the tort, awarding Appellees
considerably less than they could have received.

Thus, the award

was reasonable inasmuch as it was based on standard tort law and
was considerably less than what could have been awarded.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT'S ASSESSMENT OF COSTS WAS NOT IMPROPER
In addition to everything else Appellant has deemed worthy of
this Court's attention, he also finds fault with the trial Court's
assessment of costs.

Though he has cited U.R.C.P. 54, he has

apparently overlooked the fact that it makes the trial Court's
assessment of costs discretionary, and has instead demanded a full
accounting for every penny awarded.

Though the trial Court is

certainly barred from making awards that are capricious and abusive
of such discretion, there is nothing in Appellant's brief to show
an abuse of such discretion.

Instead, Appellant demands that

Appellee prove that the award was not abusive, and in doing so,
shows a basic misunderstanding of the appellate process.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACT IMPROPERLY IN DENYING
APPELLANT A HEARING ON HIS OBJECTIONS
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Appellantfs final complaint is that he was denied a hearing in
which to argue objections to Findings of Fact, etc. Rule 4-501(3),
Utah Code of Judicial Administration leaves this to the discretion
of the trial Court.

Simply put, trial Courts have discretion to

review motions without a hearing, and in this case, the trial Court
did just that.

Appellant was not denied the opportunity to make

his objections, or to put forth written motions; the Court simply
decided, in its discretion, that what it had received, by way of
written motions, was sufficient for its purposes and that it would
be better to move on.

This, it clearly had a right to do, and

therefore, was not acting improperly.
The Court should also be mindful of the importance of the rule
allowing trial Courts to determine which issues will merit the time
and expense of holding evidentiary hearings, and the reasons for
such a rule.

Though helpful when a judge's review of the motions

still leaves questions unresolved, a separate hearing presents a
substantial burden upon the system that is not merited in each and
every case.

Though there may be cases where a Court's use of

discretion may turn out to be abusive, Appellant simply has not
shown that to be the case here.
CONCLUSION
Appellant signed a Certificate of Survey, certifying that he
had either performed it or that it had been performed under his
direction, neither of which was true.
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Appellees relied upon this

Certificate and Appellant's status as a licensed surveyor, to their
detriment- They brought this suit for negligence, an issue of fact
the trial Court found in their favor, granting them a reasonable
award of damages, in light of the extent of their loss.
Appellant has shown resourcefulness in attempting to find any
basis whatsoever to avoid responsibility for Appellees loss, and
the judgment against him.

He has argued that the statute of

limitations has run; that he should not have been found negligent;
that useful evidence should have been admitted; that pre-judgment
interest should not have been awarded; that costs should not have
been granted; and that an evidentiary hearing, discretionary with
the Court, should have been held.
Appellant has not, however, proved his case on any of his many
points.

First, he argues that the suit should have been barred by

the statute of limitations, even though the discovery rule has been
held

to

apply

to

surveyor-negligence

cases, contending

that

Appellees should have known, from a ten-foot discrepancy that
existed in the Warranty Deed description, that the survey had been
performed negligently.

In doing so, however, Appellant fails to

recognize that what Appellees "knew or should have known" is an
issue of fact, and therefore the standard of review is much higher,
namely, whether the Findings of Fact lacked any rational basis.
The trial Court had the following bases from which to find as
it did:

(1) the property was located in a remote, wilderness

location, whose boundaries were marked only by stakes; (2) the
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property in question constituted 40 acres; (3) the relationship
between the 10 foot discrepancy and the 1000 feet was 1% and the
loss of 2 0 acres was enormous; (4) the act of surveying is one
which is limited, in the State of Utah, to professionals who have
been licensed by the State, so as to protect members of the public,
and therefore is one on which a reasonable lay person would have a
right to rely; (5) Appellees were lay members of the public, and
did not have sufficient knowledge of surveying to second-guess a
licensed surveyor; (6) the survey was performed from an unrecorded
plat rather than the metes and bounds description; and (7) the
unrecorded plat survey was performed from the center of Red Creek,
which common sense, as well as professional practice, would have
suggested as being subject to imprecise measurement since creeks
meander.

(R. 175-176; 184)

Given so many reasonable bases on which to find as the trial
Court did, Appellant's attack must surely fail.

He is free to

disagree with the outcome, but he cannot, credibly, deny that there
were reasonable bases for the outcome. Appellant argues that "the
trial Court used an improper measure of damages in calculating the
amount to award Appellees" but this is clearly deceptive.

Once

again, the issue is presented as a legal one, so as to allow the
appellate Court the greatest latitude for review.

A closer look,

however, shows that the issue Appellant is raising is not "an
improper measure of damages;" it's the very judgment of liability
against him. Appellant is really saying that he was not negligent
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and should not have been held liable•

This, however, is another

issue to be determined, primarily, by the fact finder, and only
subject to review upon a rational basis standard. Appellees relied
upon Appellant's survey to believe they had no problems with their
property, and were thereby deluded from doing anything about the
problem.

As a result, the problem was never cured, half of the

property was permanently lost (the company selling and subdividing
the property later went out of business), and the Appellees, acting
upon that "knowledge" entered into a detrimental sale of the
property.

They also lost the opportunity they had seized through

the sale, discovering the error too late to recover the property or
the opportunity to sell it at its peak value.
Appellant then argues that the trial Court

should have

admitted the diary of John Stafford, even though it constituted
hearsay

evidence, contending

that

it merited

inclusion

as a

"business record." Once again, Appellant's argument fails for the
following reasons:

First, the diary itself is questionable as a

"business record" given the fact the actual business status of the
team is, itself, questionable.

They were not incorporated, since

they were not licensed surveyors and could not, therefore, hold
themselves out as such, but their relationship to Calder was
equally questionable, Calder having claimed that they did not work
for him, even though the Certificate bore his name and the heading,
"Wilson and Calder, Consulting Engineers and Surveyors, Duchesne,
Utah."

It wold be inconsistent to allow Calder to deny that these
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men were working for him, and yet allow him to make use of the
diary as a "business record," especially when these men were
incapable of running a surveyor business, lacking a license to do
so, and could only perform surveys under the direction of someone
who was licensed.
Second, the diary could have been excluded

for lack of

"reliability," which is a critical element in the admission of a
business record. Not only was the work performed by those who were
not licensed to perform it, a quick glance at the journal entries
will show that they contain nothing that describes how the surveys
were done; they're just entries listing jobs performed, places
visited, etc. (See Appellant's Addendum)
Finally, even if taken as a "business record," the diary could
still have been excluded for other reasons, such as relevance. Not
only did the diary contain nothing useful to an understanding of
what the surveyors did, in terms of how they surveyed the property,
it likewise fails to provide relevant evidence as to the real
issue: whether Calder, as opposed to the surveyors themselves, was
negligent.

It is what Calder did, or failed to do, that counts,

and yet the diary says nothing about this.

Therefore, it was

irrelevant and was properly excluded. Furthermore, since relevance
is an issue for the trier of fact, due deference is given the trial
Court, and, once again the reasonable basis standard applies.
As for the issue of pre-judgment interest, appellant has erred
in failing to distinguish between contract law and tort law,
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attempting to argue that pre-judgment interest is not available for
liquidated damages when liquidated damages were not being awarded.
Since tort law uses the rule that pre-judgment interest applies
from the date of the tort, and the trial Court only dated such
damages from the institution of the suit, some 14 years later, the
awarding of such damages was more than reasonable.
Finally, as to the last two issues, of the trial Court's
assessment

of costs and

its denial

of a separate

evidentiary

hearing to rule on Appellant's objections, appellant has failed to
realize

that

discretion.

these

are

issues

for which

the

trial

Court

has

Not having succeeded in proving that the trial Court

had abused that discretion, Appellant is not entitled to a reversal
of the trial Court's findings.

Once again, failure to achieve the

desired result at trial is not a proper basis for overturning such
judgments on Appeal.

Appellees request that this Court deny the

Appeal of Appellant and affirm the judgment of the trial Court.
Respectfully submitted this
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/ Z7

day of December, 1993.
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